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ASHCROFT V. AL-KIDD:
TROUBLING DEVELOPMENTS
IN POST-9/11 FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
David Doeling*
In March 2003, FBI agents pretextually arrested Abdullah al-Kidd
under the federal material witness statute. As a result, al-Kidd brought
a Bivens action in federal district court against U.S. Attorney General
John Ashcroft. The court denied Ashcroft’s assertions of absolute and
qualified immunity, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. In Aschroft v. al-Kidd the U.S. Supreme Court correctly held
that qualified immunity protected Ashcroft against al-Kidd’s lawsuit.
But the Court’s unnecessary conclusion that Ashcroft did not violate the
Fourth Amendment is troubling. Not only did the Court expand the
“objectively reasonable” test that is typically applied to law
enforcement officers in the field but it also proposed a definition of
“suspicion” that is at odds with its own precedent. The combined effect
of these developments is an alarming ability on the part of authorities to
avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest warrants. When an
arresting authority’s state of mind is shielded from constitutional
scrutiny, and when the definition of suspicion is as broad as the Court
has construed it, the result is the erosion of basic Fourth Amendment
protections.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I thank Professor Samuel
Pillsbury, Jay Strozdas, and Joshua Rich for their invaluable comments and criticism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2003, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents
arrested Abdullah al-Kidd under the federal material witness statute.1
Al-Kidd brought suit against U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft,
alleging that Ashcroft used the statute as a pretext for detaining
suspected terrorists.2 Ashcroft asserted qualified and absolute
immunity.3 In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Ashcroft was protected by qualified immunity, thus overturning the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4 The
Court emphasized that Supreme Court precedent, particularly Whren
v. United States,5 shows that the Court only considers that which is
objectively reasonable—not subjective intentions—when applying
the Fourth Amendment.6 As Ashcroft’s actions were objectively
reasonable under the material witness statute, he did not violate alKidd’s Fourth Amendment rights and thus was protected by qualified
immunity against al-Kidd’s claims.7
Despite its apparently uncontroversial holding, al-Kidd may
have far-reaching, detrimental consequences for Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Although the Court was correct in emphasizing that
Whren and similar cases refused to consider the subjective intentions
of law enforcement officers,8 the Court failed to consider the
particular factual contexts in which those cases arose. Each of the
Supreme Court cases that emphasized the irrelevancy of subjective
intentions involved law enforcement officers who conducted
warrantless searches and seizures.9 In contrast, al-Kidd involved a

1. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2085.
5. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
6. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
7. Id.
8. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000); Whren, 517 U.S. at 814; Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
9. E.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34–35 (discussing warrantless vehicular checkpoint searches);
Whren, 517 U.S. at 808 (discussing the temporary detention of a motorist). In Scott, government
agents installed wiretaps pursuant to valid court authorization. 436 U.S. at 130–31. However, the
issue in that case was whether the agents went beyond the scope of the court’s authorization by
failing to “minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception
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high ranking federal official who implemented a broad policy of
preventive detentions with ostensibly valid arrest warrants.10 The
Court therefore applied the factually confined holdings of Whren and
similar cases to the factually dissimilar case of al-Kidd.
Such an expansion of the “objectively reasonable” test is
particularly troubling in light of the Court’s adoption of a new
definition of “suspicion” in al-Kidd. The Court argued in a footnote
that suspicion involves not merely suspicion of wrongdoing but
rather suspicion of anything, including benign behavior such as
knowledge of a crime or of a criminal defendant.11 When combined
with the Court’s refusal to consider the subjective intentions of law
enforcement officers and prosecutors alike, the result is an alarming
ability on the part of authorities to avoid the probable cause
requirement for arrest warrants. Now, prosecutors may pretextually
seek arrest warrants for suspects under statutes that do not require a
showing of wrongdoing and without providing probable cause for the
actual reasons for the arrest warrants.
This Comment argues that the Court’s holding in al-Kidd
constitutes troubling new developments in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II outlines the facts and procedural history of the
case. Part III summarizes the Court’s reasoning. Part IV gives a
historical overview of the material witness statute, with an emphasis
on the differences in the federal government’s use of the statute
before and after September 11, 2001. Part V argues that the Court’s
holding in al-Kidd misapplies precedent and inappropriately expands
the objectively reasonable test that courts use in search and seizure
cases. Part V also discusses the Court’s new definition of suspicion,
which, combined with the Court’s expansion of the objectively
reasonable test, erodes the probable cause requirement for arrest
warrants.

under” the applicable statute. Id. at 130. In that sense, the issue in Scott was whether the
government agents conducted unlawful warrantless searches.
10. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
11. Id. at 2082 n.2.
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II. STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
FBI agents apprehended al-Kidd in March 2003 as he was
checking in for a flight to Saudi Arabia.12 They arrested al-Kidd
under the federal material witness statute,13 which authorizes judges
to “order the arrest of [a] person” whose testimony “is material in a
criminal proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.”14
Two days before al-Kidd’s arrest, federal officials had informed a
U.S. magistrate judge that information crucial to the prosecution of
suspected Saudi Arabian terrorist Sami Omar al-Hussayen15 would
be lost if al-Kidd were to board his flight to Saudi Arabia.16 Federal
officials held al-Kidd in custody for sixteen days, and although alKidd remained on supervised release for fourteen months until the
conclusion of al-Hussayen’s trial, the prosecution never called him as
a witness.17
In March 2005, al-Kidd filed a Bivens action against Ashcroft.18
Al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft used the material witness statute as a
pretext for arresting and investigating people whom he suspected of
having ties with terrorist organizations.19 Al-Kidd argued that
because federal officials lacked sufficient evidence to charge such
individuals with a crime, federal officials instead detained them
under the material witness statute.20 According to al-Kidd, federal
officials never intended to call him as a witness.21 Rather, they

12. Id. at 2079.
13. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
15. Sami Omar al-Hussayen had been charged with multiple false-statement and visa-fraud
offenses. Brief for Petitioner at 3, al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (No. 10-98). Although al-Hussayen
indicated on his student visa application that he was entering the United States solely for the
purpose of pursuing academic study, federal prosecutors believed that he was providing support
to a terrorist organization in North Africa. Id. The jury acquitted him on some charges and failed
to reach a verdict on others. Id. at 5.
16. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(creating a cause of action against federal officials for injuries that were caused by violations of
the Fourth Amendment).
19. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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suspected him of ties to al-Hussayen and thus arrested him as part of
their “pretextual detention policy.”22
Ashcroft filed a motion to dismiss al-Kidd’s complaint, asserting
absolute and qualified immunity.23 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Idaho denied Ashcroft’s motion, and a divided panel of
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.24 The Ninth Circuit held that Ashcroft
was protected by neither absolute nor qualified immunity and that the
Fourth Amendment disallows pretextual material witness arrests
without probable cause of criminal wrongdoing.25 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.26
III. REASONING OF
THE COURT
The issue before the Court in al-Kidd was whether qualified
immunity protected Ashcroft from a suit that arose out of al-Kidd’s
arrest—an arrest that was lawful under the material witness statute
but that lacked evidence of wrongdoing.27 The Court examined
whether al-Kidd pled facts sufficient to satisfy the Court’s twopronged qualified immunity test, which looks to whether (1) the
official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.28
While the Court recognized that it did not need to address both
prongs of the test in order to overturn the lower court’s decision, it
did so nonetheless, emphasizing that when a “Court of Appeals does
address both prongs of qualified-immunity analysis, we have
discretion to correct errors at each step.”29
The Court first looked to whether Ashcroft violated al-Kidd’s
Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment protects people
from “unreasonable . . . seizures,”30 and an arrest is an example of
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 981 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074
(2011). The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).
25. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079; al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952, 970. Judge Bea dissented from the
Ninth Circuit court’s holding. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 981 (Bea, J., dissenting).
26. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080.
27. Id. at 2079.
28. Id. at 2080 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal quotations omitted).
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such a seizure.31 According to the Court, although al-Kidd conceded
the reasonableness of using the material witness warrant for the
purpose of securing his testimony, he challenged the reasonableness
of using the material witness warrant for the purpose of detaining
him as a suspected terrorist.32 Ultimately, the determinative issue
was whether Ashcroft’s subjective intent should be considered in
determining the reasonableness of his actions under the Fourth
Amendment.33
The Court emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness
is “predominately an objective inquiry.”34 It looks to the objective
circumstances of the challenged action,35 not to the subjective intent
of the officer.36 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that it had
created an exception to this rule in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,37
in which it held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless
vehicle checkpoints that are used for detecting illegal drugs.38 The
Ninth Circuit, which principally relied on Edmond, interpreted the
case to mean that an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment if law
enforcement officers conducted it with an illicit “programmatic
purpose,” such as general crime control.39 But the Court dismissed
this interpretation, stating that Edmond only prohibits searches or
seizures that police conduct with an illicit programmatic purpose and
make “pursuant to a general scheme without individualized
suspicion.”40 Thus, the Court held, the determining factor under
Edmond is not “programmatic purpose” by itself, but “programmatic
purpose” and a lack of “individualized suspicion.”41 Here, the Court
stated that because a neutral U.S. magistrate judge issued a warrant

31. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–08
(1979) (stating that arrest qualifies as a “seizure”)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000)).
35. Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
36. Id. at 2081 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996)).
37. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
38. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48). The Court also briefly
discussed special-needs and administrative-search cases, where “actual motivations” are relevant.
Id. at 2080–81 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)).
39. See id.; al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2009).
40. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–46).
41. Id.
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based on “individualized reasons,” this was not an instance where
officials lacked individualized suspicion.42
The Court stressed that a warrant based on individualized
suspicion affords the arrestee (here, al-Kidd) greater protection than
he would get in the factual situations of other Court cases where the
Court “eschew[ed] inquiries into intent.”43 For example, in both
Whren44 and Devenpeck v. Alford45 the Court refused to consider the
subjective intent of officers who undertook seizures that were
supported by probable cause but that lacked a warrant.46 And in
Terry v. Ohio47 and United States v. Knights48 the Court applied an
objective standard to warrantless searches supported by reasonable
suspicion.49
The Court then examined whether Ashcroft’s conduct violated
clearly established law. An official violates clearly established law if,
at the time of the conduct, “[t]he contours of [a] right [are]
sufficiently clear” such that a “reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”50 The Court
noted that no judicial opinion has held that an objectively reasonable
arrest that is made under the material witness statute is
unconstitutional due to pretext.51 Also, the Court dismissed the Ninth
Circuit’s argument that Ashcroft was given clear warning of the
unconstitutionality of his actions because a footnote in a district court
opinion stated that his actions were illegitimate.52 The Court
emphasized that a district court dictum in a footnote is not
controlling in any jurisdiction, much less in the entire nation.53
Finally, the Court rebutted the Ninth Circuit’s assertions that

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 2082.
Id.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
543 U.S. 146 (2004).
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
534 U.S. 112 (2001).
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 121–22; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–

22).
50. Id. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2084. The footnote in question reads in part: “Relying on the material witness
statute to detain people who are presumed innocent under our Constitution in order to prevent
potential crimes is an illegitimate use of the statute.” United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d
55, 77 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
53. al-Kidd, 131 U.S. at 2084.
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Ashcroft’s conduct violated the history and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, stating that courts should not “define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.”54
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Ashcroft did not violate
clearly established law.55 Thus, as neither prong of the two-part
qualified immunity test was met, the Court held that qualified
immunity did protect Ashcroft against al-Kidd’s claims.56 The
Court’s decision, which it announced in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
was unanimous.57 However, Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and
Justice Sotomayor each filed their own concurrences.58 Justice
Kennedy briefly discussed the material witness statute in light of
Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, and he proposed judicial
deference to national office holders for qualified immunity
purposes.59 Justice Ginsburg questioned the validity of the warrant,
and in a footnote she discussed the Court’s traditional definition of
suspicion.60 Justice Sotomayor disputed the majority’s decision to
rule on the constitutionality of Ashcroft’s actions under the Fourth
Amendment rather than simply hold that Ashcroft did not violate
clearly established law.61

54. Id.
55. Id. at 2085.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2078.
58. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined Part I of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor
joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion. Id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer joined Justice Sotomayor’s opinion. Id. at 2089 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Justice Kagan did not take part in the decision. Id. at 2085.
59. Id. at 2085–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lyle Denniston, A New “Kennedy Doctrine,”
SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/a-new-kennedydoctrine (discussing Justice Kennedy’s proposition that presidential cabinet members should have
“even greater legal immunity . . . than has existed”).
60. Id. at 2087–89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 2089–90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The concurrences also seemed to call into
question the constitutionality of the material witness statute. Justice Kennedy stated that “the
scope of the [material witness] statute’s lawful authorization is uncertain,” and the Court’s
holding “leaves unresolved whether the Government’s use of the Material Witness Statute in this
case was lawful.” Id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Sotomayor stated
that “this case does not present an occasion to address the proper scope of the material witness
statute or its constitutionality.” Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
OF THE MATERIAL
WITNESS STATUTE
The authority of the federal government to arrest and detain a
witness dates back to the eighteenth century.62 The Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789 granted federal courts the authority to issue “a warrant
for the removal of the offender, [or] the witness.”63 The Court has
articulated the rationale for such broad authority by emphasizing that
the “duty to disclose knowledge of crime . . . is so vital that one
known to be innocent may be detained . . . as a material witness.”64
This rationale and authority is ultimately rooted in the English law
that was in effect at the time of American independence, which
provided that all British subjects owe the king their “knowledge and
discovery.”65
Consistent with this history, in 1984 Congress passed the
material witness statute.66 The material witness statute authorizes
federal courts to issue an arrest warrant for witnesses who have
material information and who could flee if they were subpoenaed.67
Prior to 9/11, the material witness statute was used almost
exclusively by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
arrest illegal immigrants and secure their testimony against their
smugglers before they left the country.68 According to a study by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the INS made 3,959 of the 4,203
material witness arrests between October 1, 1999, and September 30,

62. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1971).
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789–1799) (emphasis added).
64. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964).
65. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279–80 (1919) (citing Countess of Shrewsbury's
Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 769, 778 (1612)).
66. Human Rights Watch & ACLU, Witness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses Under the
Material Witness Law Since September 11, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2005, at 1, 11 n.13
[hereinafter Witness to Abuse], available at www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/materialwitnessreport.pdf.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
68. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 14; see also Donald Q. Cochran, Material Witness
Detention in a Post-9/11 World: Mission Creep or Fresh Start? 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7–8
(2011) (discussing how federal witnesses were typically detained to testify in immigration offense
prosecutions).
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2000.69 In contrast, the FBI made only 24 arrests under the material
witness statute during the same period.70
After 9/11, however, the federal government began using the
material witness statute to detain terrorism suspects as witnesses.71
High government officials noted the importance and effectiveness of
the material witness statute as a means of combating terrorism.72
Ashcroft stated that “[a]ggressive detention of lawbreakers and
material witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting, or delaying new
attacks.”73 Similarly, then- Assistant U.S. Attorney General Michael
Chertoff emphasized that the material witness statute is an
“important investigative tool in the war on terrorism . . . . Bear in
mind that you get not only testimony—you get fingerprints, you get
hair samples—so there’s all kinds of evidence you can get from a
witness.”74
This policy of “aggressive detention” that Ashcroft and Chertoff
outlined was reflected in the number and pattern of arrests that were
made under the material witness statute. Whereas the number of INS
material witness arrests decreased from 3,959 in 2000 to 3,482 in
2002, the number of FBI material witness arrests increased from 24
in 2000 to 123 in 2002.75 Although the Department of Justice did not
reveal how many of its arrestees were held in connection with
counterterrorism investigations, a study that Human Rights Watch
(HRW) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) conducted

69. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, at 16 (2002) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2000], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=605.
70. Id.
71. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 15–16. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The
Unconstitutionality of ‘Hold Until Cleared’: Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the
Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 682–95 (2005) (discussing the
federal government’s pretextual use of the material witness statute after 9/11).
72. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 17–19; see Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material
Witnesses, and the War on Terror, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2002) (“Material witness
laws provide the government with the perfect avenue to jail those it considers dangerous.”).
73. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Ashcroft Outlines Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force (Oct. 31, 2001) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_31.htm.
74. Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo, WASH.
POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1.
75. COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, supra note 69, at 16; BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2002, at 16 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=597.
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reveals that, as of June 2005, the federal government had arrested at
least 70 material witnesses in connection with such investigations.76
V. ANALYSIS
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,77 the Court
held that a violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights gives
rise to a federal cause of action against the offending government
official.78 However, government officials are immune from liability
for civil damages so long as they do not (1) violate a statutory or
constitutional right that is (2) clearly established.79 In al-Kidd,
although the Court was correct in concluding that al-Kidd’s Fourth
Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of his arrest,
it improperly concluded that the FBI did not violate that right.
A. Aschroft Did Not Violate
Clearly Established Law
The Court in al-Kidd properly concluded that Ashcroft did not
violate clearly established law. The Court’s emphasis in Whren that
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis”80 shows that al-Kidd’s rights were not
clearly established at the time of his arrest. As Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged in her concurrence, “[g]iven Whren v. United
States . . . no ‘clearly established law’ renders Ashcroft answerable
in damages.”81 However, this does not mean that Ashcroft did not
violate al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights. It only means that such
rights were not clearly established at the time of al-Kidd’s arrest.
B. Ashcroft Violated al-Kidd’s
Fourth Amendment Rights
The Court misapplied its own precedent in holding that Ashcroft
did not violate al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights. In particular, it
removed the holdings of Whren and similar cases from their factual
contexts and applied them to the factually dissimilar case of al-Kidd,
76. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 16.
77. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
78. Id.
79. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); supra note 28 and accompanying text.
80. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
81. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
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thereby expanding the objectively reasonable test that is used in
Fourth Amendment analysis. Combined with the Court’s new
definition of suspicion, its decision erodes the probable cause
requirement for arrest warrants.
1. Misapplied Precedent and
an Expansion of the
Objectively Reasonable Test
Whether a government official violated a person’s constitutional
rights is determined by the contours of the Fourth Amendment.82
Typically, when it has decided whether a search or seizure is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has declined to
consider as determinative the subjective intent of the officer.83
Rather, the Court has objectively examined the circumstances of the
challenged action.84 In Scott v. United States85 the Court stated that
“[s]ubjective intent . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct
illegal or unconstitutional”86 and noted its own past emphasis on “the
objective aspect of the term ‘reasonable.’”87 Most importantly, in
Whren the Court held that police officers’ brief detention of a
motorist who had committed a civil traffic violation was not made
invalid by the officers’ intention to search the vehicle for illegal
narcotics.88 The Court stressed that subjective intent is largely
irrelevant in typical Fourth Amendment analysis and thus refused to
consider as probative the officers’ ulterior motive in stopping the
motor vehicle.89
However, the particular language that the Court used in past
cases suggests that application of the objectively reasonable test is
limited. In Whren the Court stated that an officer’s subjective intent
plays “no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment

82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Of course, government officials can violate rights that are
derived from other amendments to the Constitution. This Comment, however, limits its
discussion to the Fourth Amendment.
83. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
84. Id.
85. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 137 (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)).
88. 517 U.S. at 812–13 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)).
89. Id.
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analysis.”90 Applying this language in Edmond, the Court recognized
the general applicability of the objectively reasonable test but
nonetheless concluded that “programmatic purposes may be relevant
to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant
to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”91 In addition,
the Court has deemed both special-needs cases and administrativesearch cases to be outside “ordinary” Fourth Amendment analysis
such that the Court must consider the motivations of the officers who
conducted the searches.92 These cases show the Court’s
unwillingness to apply the objectively reasonable test universally to
Fourth Amendment cases. For these reasons, the Court in al-Kidd
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to place al-Kidd’s case squarely
within the Whren line of cases and qualify it for the objectively
reasonable test.
The Court in al-Kidd implied that an arrest that was made with a
material witness warrant falls within the ordinary Fourth Amendment
analysis that it had identified in Whren. It did so by stating that an
arrest “qualifies as a ‘seizure.’”93 This is true, but as Justice
Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, the Court has never considered
whether an official’s subjective intent matters in the “novel”
situation where officials detain an individual for a prolonged period
“without probable cause to believe he had committed any criminal
offense.”94 Also, the Court has historically applied the objectively
reasonable test only to situations where an officer is conducting a
warrantless search or seizure, not where an officer is arresting a
person with an ostensibly valid warrant. For example, in Devenpeck
the Court did not consider the intentions of officers who undertook
the warrantless arrest of a person who was impersonating a police
officer.95 Similarly, in Whren the Court refused to consider the
90. Id. at 813 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)
(deciding not to consider subjective intent because “our holding rests on ordinary Fourth
Amendment analysis”).
91. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000).
92. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (special needs);
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294–95 (1984) (administrative search).
93. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). The Court also stated that Ashcroft’s
case was neither a special-needs case nor an administrative-search case. Id. at 2081.
94. Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The fact that it is unclear whether lawenforcement officers validly obtained the warrant makes this factual scenario even more unique.
Id. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
95. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 149–50 (2004).
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subjective intent of police officers who briefly detained suspects
without a warrant during the course of a traffic stop.96 In both Terry
and Knights the Court examined the objectively reasonable behavior
of police officers who conducted warrantless searches. Al-Kidd did
not involve an example of such warrantless arrests or searches.
Instead, it involved Ashcroft’s policy of obtaining valid material
witness warrants for the purpose of preventive detention.
Most importantly, Whren and similar cases applied the
objectively reasonable test to law enforcement officers in the field,
not to high-ranking federal prosecutors such as the attorney general.
Each of the cases that the Court cited in support of its refusal to
consider the subjective intent of Ashcroft—Whren, Scott, and
Edmond—involved the decisions of law enforcement officers in the
field.97 In Whren police officers searched a vehicle,98 while in Scott
government agents installed wiretaps,99 and in Edmond police
officers conducted a vehicular checkpoint.100 The Court implicitly
acknowledged this distinction in Devenpeck when it stated that an
“officer’s state of mind . . . is irrelevant to the existence of probable
cause.”101
In contrast, in al-Kidd the relevant subjective intentions were not
those of the arresting officer but rather those of Ashcroft, the
attorney general. In making the objectively reasonable test applicable
to high-ranking federal officials, the Court signaled its intent not to
question the motives behind potentially far-reaching prosecutorial
decisions. Thus, the Court extended the applicability of the
objectively reasonable test beyond the individual decisions of law
enforcement officers and agents to the broad policies of federal
policy makers—an obvious example of which is the federal
government’s national policy of detaining terrorist suspects under the
material witness statute.

96. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–09 (1996).
97. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34–35 (2000); Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09;
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1978).
98. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09.
99. Scott, 436 U.S. at 131–32.
100. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34–35.
101. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (emphasis added).
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2. A New Definition of Suspicion
and an Erosion of the Probable Cause
Requirement for Arrest Warrants
The consequence of expanding the objectively reasonable test is
particularly alarming when it is considered in conjunction with the
Court’s new definition of suspicion. In discussing the warrant that
federal officials used in al-Kidd, the Court emphasized that a warrant
that is based on individualized suspicion affords arrestees significant
protection.102 In footnote two of its decision, the Court provided a
definition of such suspicion.103 According to the Court, suspicion in
the context of the Fourth Amendment does not mean suspicion of
“wrongdoing.”104 Rather, the Court stated that the “common and
idiomatic” use of the word suspicion means suspicion of anything,
such as “I have a suspicion she is throwing me a surprise birthday
party.”105
As Justice Ginsburg argued in her concurrence,106 the term
“suspicion” in “legal argot” is not susceptible to this definition107
because
suspicion
means
“individualized
suspicion
of
wrongdoing.”108 In O’Connor v. Ortega,109 for example, the Court
discussed the individualized suspicion of misconduct by the person
whose offices were searched by police.110 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.111
the Court noted that a search of a student’s purse was based on
suspicion that she had violated school rules.112 And in Michigan v.
Summers,113 while discussing exceptions to the probable cause
requirement, the Court emphasized that police must have “an
articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.”114
The Court’s refusal in al-Kidd to accept the traditional definition
of suspicion does not bode well for the probable cause requirement

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2011).
Id. at 2082 n.2.
Id. at 2082.
Id.
Id. at 2088–89 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2088 n.3 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000)).
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
Id. at 726.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 342 n.8.
452 U.S. 692 (1981).
Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
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for arrest warrants. The language that the Court used seems to
explicitly sanction warrants, such as the material witness warrant,
that are not supported by suspicion of wrongdoing but suspicion of
whatever a federal or state statute identifies as a permissible reason
for arrest. This alone may not be alarming because the federal
government’s authority to arrest material witnesses has been in effect
since the nation’s founding. Yet when the Court’s definition of
suspicion is combined with the Court’s refusal to consider the
subjective intentions of prosecutors and policy makers, its decision
allows officials to avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest
warrants. As long as officials have probable cause to believe that a
suspect qualifies for arrest under a state or federal statute—which, in
light of the Court’s opinion, need not require wrongdoing—they may
obtain an arrest warrant despite the fact that they lack probable cause
for that which the suspect is actually suspected of and arrested for.115
Al-Kidd provides an example of this. Although Ashcroft had
probable cause to believe that al-Kidd had material information that
was necessary for the trial of al-Hussayen, al-Kidd was actually
arrested as a suspected terrorist, for which Ashcroft lacked probable
cause.116 As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in its decision, although
al-Kidd was named in the warrant, the result is nonetheless the same
as that of a general warrant and its inherent disregard of
individualized probable cause—“gutting the substantive protections
of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘probable cause’ requirement and giving
the state the power to arrest upon the executive’s mere suspicion.”117
The federal government’s use of the material witness statute
after 9/11 further highlights these concerns. As the study by HRW
and the ACLU shows, between September 11, 2001, and June 2005,
at least seventy suspects were detained in connection with
counterterrorist investigations under the material witness statute.118
Although the government presumably provided probable cause to
believe that such suspects were material witnesses, it did not provide
probable cause to believe that they committed illegal terrorist
activities. Thus, the government arrested more than seventy people
115. See generally Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 941–43 (9th Cir. 1971) (discussing
the probable cause requirement in the context of the material witness statute).
116. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011).
117. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 972 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
118. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 16.
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without providing probable cause for the true reason for which they
were arrested (i.e., wrongdoing). Such a systematic avoidance of the
probable cause requirement for arrest warrants is far more alarming
than the relatively isolated incidents in Whren and similar cases are.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the al-Kidd Court was correct in holding that Ashcroft
did not violate a clearly established law, its conclusion that Ashcroft
did not violate al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights will have
detrimental consequences for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Among other statements, the Court’s emphasis in Whren that
subjective intent plays “no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis”119 forecloses the assertion that al-Kidd’s rights
were clearly established at the time of his arrest. Although the Court
could have ended its inquiry at this point, it further analyzed whether
Ashcroft violated al-Kidd’s rights, clearly established or not. It is this
analysis that makes the opinion far more wide reaching—and
detrimentally so—than was originally necessary. The opinion
constitutes a significant expansion of the objectively reasonable
standard for determining Fourth Amendment violations, and, when it
is combined with the Court’s definition of suspicion, it creates a
potentially severe erosion of the probable cause requirement for
arrest warrants.

119. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (emphasis added).
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